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Abstract
I analyze if the excessive quality disclosure finding of the “classical literature” extends to
environments in which consumers have a downward-sloping demand. While the answer is affir-
mative, there are at least two situations under which disclosure is socially insufficient: (1) when
there are quality levels that are too low to generate any positive demand; and (2) when the
prior beliefs place sufficiently higher weight on lower qualities. In both cases, non-disclosure by
the seller leads to a severe reduction in the perceived quality, thereby significantly lowering the
demand and the quantity consumed.
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1 Introduction
When potential buyers of a product are unable to observe the product quality prior to purchase
but know that the seller is informed about it, they may anticipate that this information will be
communicated, especially in favorable situations that benefit the seller. In fact, if the seller has
access to a verifiable and costless means of disclosing information, then quality will be fully revealed
in all equilibria. This is the so-called ‘information unraveling’ result, which was first established
by Grossman (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980), and Milgrom (1981).1 In the words of Grossman
and Hart (1980):
The buyer must use the simple logic that the seller tries to be as optimistic as possible
about his product subject to the constraint that he not lie.
When disclosure involves a strictly positive cost, on the other hand, Jovanovic (1982) shows that
information does not fully unravel in equilibrium. In this case, the seller would rather stay silent
for qualities that are below a certain threshold. However, disclosure is socially wasteful because it
is purely redistributive. In other words, the seller engages in excessive information disclosure when
it is costly to disclose quality.
The “classical literature” assumes that consumers have unit demands with identical reservation
prices.2 Under this assumption, the total quantity consumed in equilibrium is the same for all
disclosure policies. Therefore, for any positive disclosure cost (regardless of how small it is), all
policies other than non-disclosure involve socially excessive levels of information disclosure.3 How-
ever, it is not clear if this same result carries over to situations in which the market demand is
downward-sloping. In such a case, disclosure generally leads to a change in the equilibrium quantity
consumed and is therefore not purely redistributive anymore. Since the seller ignores any consumer
surplus effects when making his disclosure decision, disclosure will be socially inefficient. However,
1To see the intuition, suppose there are n > 1 possible quality levels. If the product has the highest possible
quality, the seller would surely reveal it because staying silent would simply induce a lower perceived quality and a
lower willingness-to-pay. Thus, when consumers see non-disclosure, they will place zero probability on the highest
quality and as a result the expected quality in case of non-disclosure will be strictly below the second highest quality.
The seller, therefore, would as well choose full disclosure when the product has the second highest quality. Continuing
in a similar fashion, one can eliminate all qualities but the lowest one. As a result, if quality information is ever
withheld, it must be that the product has the lowest possible quality.
2By “classical literature,” I refer to Grossman (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980), Milgrom (1981), and Jovanovic
(1982).
3Note that when disclosure is costless, all disclosure policies are welfare-equivalent.
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it is a priori unclear if this inefficiency is in the form of excessive or insufficient disclosure.
As noted earlier, when the cost of disclosure is positive, there will be an interior threshold quality
level that leaves the seller indifferent between disclosing and not. If full disclosure of this particular
threshold quality strictly raises the underlying consumer surplus, however, a social planner can
improve the ex-ante expected aggregate welfare by marginally lowering this threshold.4 In such a
situation, the level of voluntary information disclosure will be socially insufficient.
To address this question, I consider a simple model with a single seller and a single consumer who
has a linear downward-sloping demand. I show that the excessive disclosure result of the “classical
literature” is still valid when all quality levels are socially desirable and the consumer’s prior beliefs
are uniform over the possible values of quality. A social planner cannot improve expected welfare
by mandating that the seller disclose a larger set of qualities. In other words, the consumer surplus
effect mentioned above is not large enough to make disclosure insufficient.
Next, I identify two situations under which voluntary disclosure may be socially insufficient;
both of these situations arise when the demand curve is sufficiently elastic: The first one is when
there are quality levels that are too low to generate any positive demand by the consumer. In this
case, non-disclosure may lead the consumer to reduce her demand to zero even if the actual quality
normally induces a positive demand when disclosed (or, in other words, even if the actual quality
is socially desirable). The second one is when the consumer’s prior beliefs place sufficiently higher
weight on lower qualities. Now, a failure to disclose quality leads to a severely bad perception of the
product, thereby significantly lowering the consumer’s demand. As a result, the amount of forgone
consumer surplus is sufficiently large.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I briefly review the
literature. Section 3 introduces the main setup. In section 4, I analyze the equilibrium and the
socially efficient levels of disclosure for three different scenarios. Finally, in section 5, I conclude.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
4Given that the seller charges a higher price under full disclosure, consumer surplus would increase only if the
quantity consumed goes up sufficiently.
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2 Related literature
There is a large literature that analyzes verifiable information disclosure. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, the classical articles are Grossman (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980), Milgrom (1981),
and Jovanovic (1982). Important extensions include Dye (1985), who introduces the possibility
that the seller does not know the quality either, Matthews and Postlewaite (1985), who endoge-
nize the decision to acquire information about quality, Fishman and Hagerty (1990), who analyze
the level of discretion a seller should be allowed in choosing how much information to disclose,
Shin (1994), who incorporates uncertainty about the degree of information the seller possesses,
and Board (2009), Cheong and Kim (2004), and Milgrom and Roberts (1986), who analyze quality
disclosure in competitive environments.5
In a recent paper, Daughety and Reinganum (2008) argue that the alternative to disclosure
should not be viewed as non-disclosure. They introduce price signaling as an alternative means
of revealing quality in a framework where demand is downward-sloping, disclosure is costly, and
marginal cost of production is strictly increasing in quality. They characterize an equilibrium in
which the seller chooses to reveal qualities below a threshold via price signaling and those above
via direct disclosure. They also find that the seller uses direct disclosure insufficiently from a social
point of view for any positive disclosure cost.
In order to understand how much of this insufficient disclosure result is driven by the assumption
of downward-sloping demand, Daughety and Reinganum (2008) construct an example in which the
marginal cost of production is independent of quality, thus making price signaling infeasible. In this
case, they find that information disclosure is socially insufficient when the cost of disclosure is above
a threshold.6 Based on this finding, they conclude that the general finding by the classical literature
that information disclosure is excessive is importantly driven by that literature’s assumption that
consumers have unit demands with identical reservation prices and that such a sweeping result is
unlikely to be found in models with downward-sloping demand.
In the benchmark scenario that I consider in section 4.1 – which has the same setup as the
example Daughety and Reinganum (2008) construct – I show that there is excessive information
disclosure for all parameter values. This finding demonstrates that the second part of Daughety and
5See Dranove and Jin (2010) for an excellent survey on verifiable information disclosure.
6See Proposition 4 (p. 985) in Daughety and Reinganum (2008).
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Reinganum’s conclusion is incorrect and shows that the excessive disclosure finding of the classical
literature can extend to more general models with downward-sloping demand.7 However, when the
demand curve is sufficiently elastic, there may be insufficient disclosure as I show in sections 4.2
and 4.3. In this regard, the insight of Daughety and Reinganum (2008) remains true.
3 Main setup
A profit-maximizing monopoly seller (he) offers a product for sale, which is characterized by its
quality: θ ∈ [0, 1]. The quality θ is exogenously given and is privately known by the seller. To make
the results comparable to the existing literature on verifiable information disclosure, I assume that
the marginal cost of production does not depend on quality and is therefore set to zero without any
loss of generality.8 On the other side of the market, there is a single consumer (she) who is unable
to observe θ prior to purchase. I consider a prior belief structure that potentially places higher
weight on lower qualities. To make the analysis simple and tractable, I assume that the consumer
places a probability µ ≥ 0 on the event that θ = 0, and a probability (1 − µ) on the event that
θ is uniformly distributed over (0, 1]. This structure allows me to alter the skewness of beliefs by
changing one parameter only.
The consumer’s utility is quadratic in the quantity of the product consumed and quasilinear in
all other goods. In particular, for a given perceived quality θ˜ and a price p, the consumer’s utility
is given by
U(p, q, θ˜) = (α− (1− θ˜)δ)q − β
2
q2 + I − pq. (1)
Here, I is the consumer’s income and (α − (1 − θ˜)δ)q − β2 q2 is her utility from consuming q
units of the product (thus, I − pq is the amount spent on all other goods). The marginal utility
of consuming the very first unit of the product is α − (1 − θ˜)δ, where a higher δ implies a more
quality-sensitive consumer. If, for instance, δ is high and the perceived quality is low, then even the
first unit of consumption may bring a negative utility. The term β, on the other hand, measures
7See the following website for their subsequent recognition that their claim is too sweeping:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/faculty/Daughety/Daughetypreviouspubs.html.
8If, for instance, marginal cost increases with quality, then price may carry a signaling role in situations where
quality is not revealed through direct disclosure. Daughety and Reinganum (2008) focus on fully separating prices in
this context and characterize an equilibrium in which both price signaling and direct disclosure are used. There is,
however, a plethora of other equilibria that involve semi-separating or pooling pricing strategies in the non-disclosure
subgame. When marginal cost does not depend on quality, these problems do not arise; all seller types that choose
non-disclosure charge the same price.
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the constant rate at which marginal utility diminishes. I assume that α, δ, β > 0 and that I is
large enough so as to ensure I − pq > 0.
Before a transaction takes place, the seller may choose fully to disclose θ through a credible
means at a cost D > 0. In this case, θ˜ = θ. If the seller chooses to stay silent, on the other hand,
the consumer makes rational inferences about θ. The consumer knows all aspects of the model
(including the cost of disclosure D) and thus can rationally infer the subset of θ for which the seller
stays silent.9 As a tie-breaking rule, I assume that the seller stays silent when he is indifferent
between disclosing and not.
For a given θ˜ and a price p, the consumer maximizes her utility by choosing the optimal quantity
q(p, θ˜). Taking the derivative of U(p, q, θ˜) with respect to q and setting it equal to zero yields the
following linear demand function:
q(p, θ˜) =
{
0 , θ˜ ≤ 1− αδ
α−(1−θ˜)δ−p
β , θ˜ > 1− αδ
. (2)
Thus, the price intercept of the demand curve is max
{
0, α− (1− θ˜)δ
}
, which depends on α, δ
and the perceived quality θ˜. If the product is of the highest possible quality, then the price intercept
is simply α. As the perceived quality goes down, the intercept shifts down at a rate δ. However, if
it is too low – i.e., if θ˜ ≤ 1− αδ – then the consumer has no demand for the product at any positive
price. In this case, low qualities of the product are socially undesirable. This is certainly relevant
only when α ≤ δ, which implies 1 − αδ ≥ 0. Otherwise, if α > δ, the product is socially desirable.
Also note that the price elasticity of demand is −p
α−(1−θ˜)δ−p , so a lower α or θ˜, or a higher δ are all
associated with a more elastic demand.
4 Equilibrium vs. socially optimal levels of disclosure
In this section, I consider three scenarios with different parameter restrictions: The first one is a
benchmark scenario in which all qualities are socially desirable (i.e., α > δ) and the consumer’s
prior beliefs are uniform over [0, 1] with no mass point at the lowest quality (i.e., µ = 0). In each
one of the other two scenarios, I relax one of these two assumptions while keeping the other one
the same. In the second scenario, the prior beliefs are uniform over [0, 1], but low qualities of the
9One can interpret this as the consumer’s learning through a process of trial and error in observing when the seller
discloses and when he does not.
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product are undesirable. In the third scenario, prior beliefs place a strictly positive probability on
θ = 0, while all qualities are socially desirable.
Before proceeding with the benchmark scenario, it is helpful to determine and discuss the
general conditions for the equilibrium and the socially optimal levels of disclosure. Given the
demand function in (2), a type-θ seller maximizes (gross of disclosure cost)
pi(p, θ, θ˜) =
p(α− (1− θ˜)δ − p)
β
. (3)
For a given perceived quality θ˜ > 1− αδ , maximizing pi(p, θ, θ˜) with respect to p yields
p(θ˜) =
α− (1− θ˜)δ
2
, (4)
q(θ˜) =
α− (1− θ˜)δ
2β
, (5)
pi(θ˜) =
(α− (1− θ˜)δ)2
4β
. (6)
If the perceived quality is below or equal to 1 − αδ , the seller does not make any production and
earns zero profits.
It is important to note from equation (5) that q(θ˜) is strictly increasing in θ˜ (recall that it was
assumed δ > 0). This means that, for a given quality θ, disclosure strictly raises the equilibrium
quantity that is purchased by the consumer, and in turn leads to a strictly higher level of aggregate
welfare (gross of the disclosure cost). This is precisely how an analysis with a downward-sloping
demand differs from the classical approach in terms of the social efficiency of disclosure; in the latter,
disclosure does not change the equilibrium level of consumption and thus is purely redistributive.
When disclosure involves a positive cost, there will be a marginal quality level θ∗ that leaves
the seller indifferent between disclosing and not. This is given by
pi (θ∗)−D = pi (E [θ | θ ≤ θ∗]) , (7)
where the left-hand side is the profit the seller earns in case of disclosure and the right-hand side
is the profit when he stays silent and the consumer infers that θ ≤ θ∗. If there is an interior θ∗
that solves (7), then the seller discloses all qualities above θ∗ while concealing those under θ∗. If
it is the case that pi (1)−D < pi (E [θ]), then the seller conceals all quality realizations, so θ∗ = 1.
This happens when the disclosure cost is sufficiently high. When D = 0, on the other hand, it is
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clear from (7) that all qualities that generate positive profits are disclosed. Hence, in this case,
θ∗ = max
{
0, 1− αδ
}
.
The socially optimal level of information disclosure can similarly be summarized by a threshold
quality level θs such that all qualities above this threshold are disclosed while the ones below are
concealed. When the true quality is θ and the perceived quality is θ˜, the aggregate welfare gross of
disclosure cost is U(p(θ˜), q(θ˜), θ) +pi(θ˜). Using the utility function given in equation (1), observing
that price is simply a transfer between the seller and the consumer, and noting that there is a
discrete probability µ that θ = 0, one can express the ex-ante expected aggregate welfare W (θs)
for a given θs as
W (θs) = µ
[
(α− δ) q(θ˜s)− β
2
(
q(θ˜s)
)2
+ I
]
(8)
+ (1− µ)
θs∫
0
[
(α− (1− θ) δ) q(θ˜s)− β
2
(
q(θ˜s)
)2
+ I
]
dθ
+ (1− µ)
1∫
θs
[
(α− (1− θ) δ) q (θ)− β
2
(q (θ))2 + I −D
]
dθ,
where θ˜s = E [θ | θ ≤ θs]. One can then find the optimal value of θs by maximizing W (θs) with
respect to θs. Once again, when the cost of disclosure is sufficiently high, this maximization problem
will imply θs = 1. Similarly, when disclosure is costless, it will imply θs = max
{
0, 1− αδ
}
. This
latter observation follows from the fact that q(θ˜) is strictly increasing in θ˜ and a higher quantity
implies a strictly higher welfare. Hence, the equilibrium and the socially optimal quality levels
coincide when disclosure is costless or when it is too costly.
As discussed earlier, the classical literature argues that when D > 0, no disclosure should take
place from a social point of view (i.e., θs = 1). This is due to the fact that disclosure does not
change the quantity consumed in equilibrium and hence is purely redistributive. However, when
the demand curve is downward-sloping, there will be an interior θs (unless D is too large), and it
is hard to say a priori if this is above or below θ∗.
4.1 Benchmark scenario: µ = 0 and α > δ
I start off with a benchmark scenario in which the consumer’s prior beliefs are uniformly distributed
over [0, 1] and all qualities are socially desirable. This setup also corresponds to the example in
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Daughety and Reinganum [2008]. Given the uniform priors, E [θ | θ < θ∗] = θ∗2 . Using the profit
function given in equation (6), the indifference condition given in (7) becomes
(α− (1− θ∗) δ)2
4β
−D =
(
α− (1− θ∗2 ) δ)2
4β
, (9)
which, after simplifying, reduces to
(θ∗)2 +
4 (α− δ)
3δ
θ∗ − 16βD
3δ2
= 0. (10)
Solving this expression for θ∗ yields
θ∗ =
1
2
−4 (α− δ)
3δ
+
√(
4 (α− δ)
3δ
)2
+
64βD
3δ2
 . (11)
Reorganizing and noting that θ∗ cannot exceed 1 leads to
θ∗ =

2(α−δ)
3δ
[√
1 + 12βD
(α−δ)2 − 1
]
, if D < (4α−δ)δ16β
1 , if D ≥ (4α−δ)δ16β
. (12)
As described earlier, the socially optimal threshold quality level θs is found by maximizing the
ex-ante expected welfare function W (θs) given in equation (8). In section A.1 of the Appendix, I
show for a general µ ∈ [0, 1] that this maximization problem leads to the following condition:
3δ2
8β
(θs − E [θ | θ ≤ θs])2 = D. (13)
For the current benchmark scenario, E [θ | θ ≤ θs] = θs2 , so condition (13) implies10
θs =

√
32βD
3δ2
, if D < 3δ
2
32β
1 , if D ≥ 3δ232β
. (14)
A simple comparison of θ∗ and θs in expressions (12) and (14) yields that θ∗ = θs = 1 when
D ≥ (4α−δ)δ16β and that θ∗ < θs = 1 when 3δ
2
32β ≤ D < (4α−δ)δ16β . Again, it is straightforward to show
that θ∗ < θs when 0 < D < 3δ
2
32β , which leads to the following result:
Proposition 1. When the consumer’s prior beliefs for quality are uniformly distributed over
[0, 1] and α > δ so that all qualities are socially desirable, the seller never engages in insufficient
disclosure.
10Alternatively, one can simply evaluate W (θs) at µ = 0 and θ˜s = θ
s
2
, and then maximize the resulting expression
with respect to θs. I adopt the current approach because I use it later in scenario 3 as well.
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As mentioned earlier, for a given quality θ, disclosure strictly raises the equilibrium quantity
purchased and in turn the area under the demand curve. However, after accounting for the cost of
disclosure, the aggregate welfare may actually go down. While the equilibrium threshold quality
that leaves the seller indifferent between disclosing and not offsets the profit gain and the cost of
disclosure, if the consumer surplus under disclosure is lower for this threshold quality level, then
disclosure will overall lead to a lower level of welfare.
The consumer surplus may indeed decrease under disclosure. As a thought experiment, consider
an extreme example and take the demand curve given by q(p, θ˜) = 1− p
θ˜
. Under this demand curve,
the quantity consumed in equilibrium is always equal to 12 regardless of the perceived quality level
θ˜. For a given actual quality θ, the realized gross surplus (net of disclosure cost) is the area
under the true demand curve q(p, θ) and to the left of the consumed quantity (again, regardless of
the perceived quality level θ˜). Since the equilibrium quantity consumed does not depend on the
particular disclosure policy, disclosure is socially wasteful for all quality levels. However, if there is
an interior equilibrium threshold quality level θ∗, the seller charges a higher price when disclosing
θ∗ than concealing it, and thus the net consumer surplus is lower.
For the particular demand function I consider in this paper, disclosure always expands the
demand curve and leads to a strictly higher equilibrium quantity purchased. However, if the increase
in the quantity purchased is not sufficiently large, the resulting change in the net consumer surplus
may be negative. Suppose the actual quality is θ and the perceived quality is θ˜. Using the utility
function given in equation (1), the equilibrium quantity given in equation (5) and equilibrium price
given in equation (4), one can easily calculate the change in consumer surplus due to disclosure:
U(p(θ), q(θ), θ)− U(p(θ˜), q(θ˜), θ) = δ(θ − θ˜)
4β
[
−
(
α−
(
1− 3θ˜ − θ
2
)
δ
)]
. (15)
Note that this expression measures the difference in the realized net utility (and hence the
realized consumer surplus) for a given quality level θ. The first term U(p(θ), q(θ), θ) measures the
net utility when θ is disclosed and thus the actual and the perceived qualities overlap. The second
term U(p(θ˜), q(θ˜), θ), on the other hand, measures the net utility when the actual quality is θ but
the perceived quality is θ˜ because the seller has not disclosed θ. The firm charges p(θ˜) knowing that
the consumer will base her purchase decision on perceived quality θ˜, and the consumer purchases
an amount q(p(θ˜), θ˜). After purchase, however, the consumer realizes that the true quality is θ.
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Thus, the relevant net utility in this case is U(p(θ˜), q(θ˜), θ).
Given that the prior beliefs are uniform over [0, 1], for any equilibrium threshold quality level
θ∗ > 0, the expression in (15) equals
U(p(θ∗), q(θ∗), θ∗)− U(p(θ∗/2), q(θ∗/2), θ∗) = −δθ
∗
8β
(
α−
(
1− θ
∗
4
)
δ
)
, (16)
which is strictly negative for any θ∗. Hence, from a social planner’s point of view, marginally
lowering θ∗ in fact lowers consumer surplus (and thus welfare). This means that the seller engages
in excessive disclosure. It should be noted that a lower quality threshold necessarily means that
the consumer’s perception of quality will be lower in case of non-disclosure. This in turn will lead
to a welfare loss for those qualities that are concealed, which makes the excessive disclosure result
even more pronounced for the current benchmark scenario.
Proposition 1 has an important implication; The unit demand assumption is not critical for
the excessive disclosure result. The same result obtains in more general environments with a linear
downward-sloping demand. However, the uniformity of the prior beliefs as well as the fact that
even the lowest quality generates a positive demand are important factors behind this result. Both
of these factors ensure that non-disclosure of quality does not lower the quantity consumed too
much, thereby keeping the demand curve relatively inelastic.11 As I show in the next two scenarios,
this observation is quite important for the results; if the demand curve becomes sufficiently elastic
under non-disclosure, then it is possible that the seller engages in excessive information disclosure.
4.2 Scenario 2: µ = 0 and α ≤ δ
In this scenario, the prior density function is still uniform over [0, 1], but now α ≤ δ, so low types
of the seller cannot generate positive profits. It also means that the demand curve is relatively
more elastic and as a result non-disclosure lowers the quantity consumed relatively more. One can
imagine a situation in which all possible quality levels are equally probable from the consumer’s
point of view, but sufficiently low qualities are undesirable and therefore generate zero demand.
This may, for instance, be due to higher potential hazards that lower quality products are associated
with. For the remainder of this subsection, I assume 2α > δ, which ensures a positive demand in
case the seller adopts a no-disclosure strategy (i.e., when the perceived quality is 12).
11Recall that a lower α or θ˜, or a higher δ are all associated with a more elastic demand.
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When the perceived quality E [θ | θ ≤ θ∗] is above 1 − αδ , the calculation of the equilibrium
threshold quality follows the same steps as in the benchmark scenario.12 However, for low values
of D, the value of θ∗ in equation (12) may fall below 2
(
1− αδ
)
: the threshold quality level, which
implies a perceived quality of 1 − αδ and thus q = 0 in case of non-disclosure. This happens when
D < (δ−α)
2
4β , so we need to recalculate θ
∗ for these values of D. If we account for zero profits in
case of non-disclosure, the indifference condition in (7) becomes
(α− (1− θ∗) δ)2
4β
−D = 0, (17)
which implies θ∗ = 1 − α−2
√
βD
δ in this region. Hence, the equilibrium value of θ
∗ in this scenario
is given by
θ∗ =

1− α−2
√
βD
δ , D <
(δ−α)2
4β
2(δ−α)
3δ
[√
1 + 12βD
(δ−α)2 + 1
]
, (δ−α)
2
4β ≤ D < (4α−δ)δ16β
1 , D ≥ (4α−δ)δ16β
. (18)
For the socially optimal threshold quality level, we follow similar steps as above. In particular,
for D < 3(δ−α)
2
8β , the value of θ
s in the benchmark scenario, given in equation (14), leads to a
perceived quality that is less than 1 − αδ , which implies q(θ˜) = 0. This means that the welfare
function in this region is
W (θs) =
1∫
θs
[
(α− (1− θ) δ) q (θ)− β
2
(q (θ))2 −D
]
dθ. (19)
One can easily find that the value of θs that maximizes this expression is θs = 1 − α−2
√
2βD/3
δ .
Hence,
θs =

1− α−2
√
2βD/3
δ , D <
3(δ−α)2
8β√
32βD
3δ2
, 3(δ−α)
2
8β ≤ D < 3δ
2
32β
1 , D ≥ 3δ232β
. (20)
Again, a simple comparison of θ∗ and θs given in (18) and (20) yields the following result:
Proposition 2. When the consumer’s prior beliefs for quality are uniformly distributed over [0, 1],
but δ2 < α ≤ δ so that low qualities are socially undesirable, the seller engages in insufficient
disclosure (i) for all D ∈
(
0, (4α−δ)δ16β
)
if α ≤ 5δ8 , or (ii) for all D ∈
(
0, 2(δ−α)
2
3β
)
if 5δ8 < α ≤ δ.13
12The only difference is that the term
(
4(α−δ)
3δ
)2
in equation (11) will come out of the square root as 4(δ−α)
3δ
.
13See the proof for further details.
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As explained in the beginning of this subsection, when α is smaller than δ, the demand curve
is relatively more elastic and therefore the reduction in quantity consumed due to non-disclosure is
relatively higher. The insufficient disclosure result is easiest to see when D < (δ−α)
2
4β . In this case,
even when the true quality level is socially desirable, the seller may choose non-disclosure (i.e.,
when 1 − αδ < θ < 1 − α−2
√
βD
δ ), which leads to a perceived quality below 1 − αδ and thus to zero
quantity consumed. From a social point of view, however, a socially desirable quality level generates
a strictly positive consumer surplus if disclosed. Therefore, marginally lowering θ∗ enhances welfare
when D < (δ−α)
2
4β . This holds true regardless of the value of
α
δ .
In the limit when α → δ2 , the second row in expression (18) disappears, so non-disclosure
always induces a perceived quality level that is below 1 − αδ . Therefore, in this case, disclosure is
insufficient for all disclosure costs.14 Similarly, when α = δ, the second row in equation (18) implies
θ∗ =
√
16βD
3δ2
for D < 3δ
2
16β , implying excessive disclosure compared with θ
s. Hence, when α is not
too much lower than δ, the insufficient disclosure result obtains only for low enough disclosure costs.
4.3 Scenario 3: µ > 0 and α > δ
In this scenario, the product is socially valuable (i.e., α > δ), but now there is a discrete probability
µ > 0 that θ = 0. This leads to a density function that is skewed to the right. The skewness can
be varied by changing the value of µ. An example is when the consumer has tried several other
products with the seller and has had bad experience with some (or most) of them.
When µ > 0, E [θ | θ < θ∗] is given by
E [θ | θ < θ∗] =
(
(1− µ)θ∗
µ+ (1− µ)θ∗
)
θ∗
2
. (21)
Unfortunately, this expression turns the indifference condition given in (7) into a 4th-order polyno-
mial, which makes difficult the reaching of a closed-form solution for θ∗. Therefore, I solve for the
equilibrium and the socially optimal threshold quality levels for the limiting case µ→ 1, and then
interpret the findings for µ ∈ (0, 1). Under this assumption, staying silent leads to a perceived qual-
ity that is approximately zero for any threshold quality level. Rewriting the indifference condition
(7) for this limiting case yields
(α− (1− θ∗) δ)2
4β
−D = (α− δ)
2
4β
, (22)
14This observation also implies that disclosure is always insufficient when α ≤ δ
2
unless D is zero or sufficiently
large.
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which, after solving for θ∗, leads to
θ∗ =

(α−δ)
δ
[√
1 + 4βD
(α−δ)2 − 1
]
, if D < α
2−(α−δ)2
4β
1 , if D ≥ α2−(α−δ)24β
. (23)
To find the socially optimal threshold quality level, we simply use condition (13), which was
also used in the benchmark scenario: 3δ
2
8β (θ
s − E [θ | θ ≤ θs])2 = D.15 Note that the only term in
this expression that depends on µ is E [θ | θ ≤ θs], which goes to 0 as µ goes to 1. Hence,
θs =

√
8βD
3δ2
, if D < 3δ
2
8β
1 , if D ≥ 3δ28β
. (24)
Comparing this with θ∗ given in expression (23) yields the following result:
Proposition 3. When µ → 1 and α > δ so that all qualities are socially desirable, the seller
engages in insufficient disclosure if αδ <
5
4 and
6(α−δ)2
β < D <
3δ2
8β .
To see the intuition for this result, suppose first that α = δ. In this case, the demand curve is
relatively more elastic and, given that µ→ 1, non-disclosure of any quality leads to a quantity that
is equal to zero (and thus zero profits for the seller). Since the seller ignores the consumer surplus
when deciding whether to disclose or not, marginally lowering θ∗ enhances the ex-ante welfare for
any D ∈
(
0, 3δ
2
8β
)
. When α is sufficiently higher than δ, on the other hand, the demand curve
becomes more inelastic and as a result the level of information disclosed by the seller becomes
excessive.
Using equation (15) and noting that non-disclosure leads to a perceived quality of zero, disclosure
of a particular θ improves the consumer surplus by an amount
U(p(θ), q(θ), θ)− U(p(0), q(0), θ) = − δθ
4β
(
α−
(
1 +
θ
2
)
δ
)
.
The term in the parenthesis is surely positive when αδ >
3
2 , implying that disclosure is always
excessive in this range. In the alternative case when 1 < αδ ≤ 32 , marginally lowering high values
of θ∗ may be beneficial. However, as discussed earlier, this will have two opposing effects. On the
one hand, the consumer will strictly benefit if the actual quality level happens to be in the region
where it was not disclosed before but is disclosed now. On the other hand, when the actual quality
15For a formal derivation of this condition, see section A.1 of the Appendix.
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is in the non-disclosure range, the consumer’s perception of quality will go down, which reduces
welfare. Overall these two effects work against each other and the proposition establishes that the
former effect dominates when αδ <
5
4 , thus leading to the insufficient disclosure result.
The above analysis ensures that there are values of α, δ and D for which market disclosure is
insufficient even when µ is strictly smaller than 1. However, based on the results obtained in the
benchmark scenario, the value of µ needs to be sufficiently high. Hence, uniformity of the prior
density function is an important factor behind the excessive disclosure result of the benchmark
scenario.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed whether the excessive disclosure result of the “classical literature”
extends to a more general setting with a linear downward-sloping demand function. I find that it
does extend unless the demand curve is highly elastic. If the demand curve is sufficiently elastic,
then there are at least two scenarios under which disclosure may be insufficient from a social
perspective: when there are quality levels that generate zero demand, and when the prior beliefs
place higher probabilities on lower qualities. An extension of this analysis might focus on the
necessary conditions for insufficient disclosure in an environment with a more general demand
function.
A Appendix
A.1 Maximization of W (θs) for α > δ and µ ∈ [0, 1]
In this section of the Appendix, I derive and simplify the first-order condition that is associated
with the maximization of the ex-ante expected welfare function given in equation (8) for α > δ and
any µ ∈ [0, 1]. For convenience, rewrite equation (8):
W (θs) = µ
[
(α− δ) q(θ˜s)− β
2
(
q(θ˜s)
)2]
+ (1− µ)
θs∫
0
[
(α− (1− θ) δ) q(θ˜s)− β
2
(
q(θ˜s)
)2]
dθ
+ (1− µ)
1∫
θs
[
(α− (1− θ) δ) q (θ)− β
2
(q (θ))2 −D
]
dθ.
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The second term above can be rewritten as
(1− µ) θs
[(
α−
(
1− θ
s
2
)
δ
)
q(θ˜s)− β
2
(
q(θ˜s)
)2]
.
Adding this term to the first term and noting that θ˜s =
(
(1−µ)θs
µ+(1−µ)θs
)
θs
2 leads to
(µ+ (1− µ) θs)
[(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
)
q(θ˜s)− β
2
(
q(θ˜s)
)2]
.
Given that q(θ˜s) =
α−(1−θ˜s)δ
2β , this term can further be simplified as
3
8β
(µ+ (1− µ) θs)
(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
)2
.
Similarly, given that q (θ) = α−(1−θ)δ2β , the third term in (8) can be rewritten as
(1− µ)
1∫
θs
[
3
8β
(α− (1− θ) δ)2 −D
]
dθ.
Hence,
W (θs) =
3
8β
(µ+ (1− µ) θs)
(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
)2
+ (1− µ)
1∫
θs
[
3
8β
(α− (1− θ) δ)2 −D
]
dθ.
Maximizing this expression with respect to θs yields the following first-order condition:
3
8β
(1− µ)
(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
)2
+
6δ
8β
(µ+ (1− µ) θs)
(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
) dθ˜s
dθs
= (1− µ)
[
3
8β
(α− (1− θs) δ)2 −D
]
Note that
dθ˜s
dθs
=
(1− µ) θs
2 (µ+ (1− µ) θs) +
µ (1− µ) θs
2 (µ+ (1− µ) θs)2
=
(1− µ)
µ+ (1− µ) θs
[
θs
2
+
µθs
2 (µ+ (1− µ) θs)
]
=
(1− µ)
µ+ (1− µ) θs
[
θs +
µθs
2 (µ+ (1− µ) θs) −
θs
2
]
=
(1− µ)
µ+ (1− µ) θs
[
θs − (1− µ) θ
s
µ+ (1− µ) θs
θs
2
]
=
(1− µ)
µ+ (1− µ) θs
(
θs − θ˜s
)
.
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So, the first-order condition above can be rewritten as
3
8β
(1− µ)
(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
)2
+
3δ
4β
(1− µ)
(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
)
(θs − θ˜s)
= (1− µ)
[
3
8β
(α− (1− θs) δ)2 −D
]
⇔ 3
8β
[
(α− (1− θs) δ)2 −
(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
)2]− 3δ
4β
(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
)
(θs − θ˜s) = D
⇔ 3δ
4β
(
α−
(
1− θ
s + θ˜s
2
)
δ
)
(θs − θ˜s)− 3δ
4β
(
α− (1− θ˜s)δ
)
(θs − θ˜s) = D.
This finally leads to
3δ2
8β
(θs − θ˜s)2 = D.
A.2 Proofs of the Propositions
In this section, I present the proofs of the propositions stated in the main text:
Proof of Proposition 1. As stated in the main text, a simple comparison of θ∗ and θs in
expressions (12) and (14) yields that θ∗ = θs = 1 when D ≥ (4α−δ)δ16β and that 0 < θ∗ < θs = 1
when 3δ
2
32β ≤ D < (4α−δ)δ16β . It only remains to compare θ∗ and θs for 3δ
2
32β ≤ D < (4α−δ)δ16β where
0 < θ∗ < θs < 1. First, rewrite θs as θs = 2(α−δ)3δ
√
24βD
(α−δ)2 . Then,
θ∗ < θs ⇔
√
1 +
12βD
(α− δ)2 − 1 <
√
24βD
(α− δ)2
⇔ 2 + 12βD
(α− δ)2 − 2
√
1 +
12βD
(α− δ)2 <
24βD
(α− δ)2
⇔ 1− 6βD
(α− δ)2 <
√
1 +
12βD
(α− δ)2 .
Since βD
(α−δ)2 > 0, the term on the left-hand side is less than 1 while the term on the right-hand
side is greater than 1. Hence, for 3δ
2
32β ≤ D < (4α−δ)δ16β , it is always true that θ∗ < θs, which means
that the seller engages in excessive information disclosure.
Proof of Proposition 2. Comparing the values of θ∗ and θs in expressions (18) and (20), it is
clear that θ∗ = 1 − α−2
√
βD
δ > 1 −
α−2
√
2βD/3
δ = θ
s when D < (δ−α)
2
4β . For
(δ−α)2
4β ≤ D < 3(δ−α)
2
8β ,
since θ∗ is increasing in D, it follows that θ∗ > 1− α−2
√
βD
δ , so once again θ
∗ > θs. Next, note that
3δ2
32β
≥ (4α− δ)δ
16β
⇔ α ≤ 5δ
8
(with equality when α =
5δ
8
).
16
When α ≤ 5δ8 , comparing θ∗ and θs for 3(δ−α)
2
8β ≤ D < (4α−δ)δ16β yields
θ∗ ≥ θs ⇔
√
1 +
12βD
(δ − α)2 + 1 ≥
√
24βD
(δ − α)2
⇔ 2 + 12βD
(δ − α)2 + 2
√
1 +
12βD
(δ − α)2 ≥
24βD
(δ − α)2
⇔ 1 + 12βD
(δ − α)2 ≥
(
6βD
(δ − α)2 − 1
)2
⇔ 24βD
(δ − α)2 ≥
(
6βD
(δ − α)2
)2
⇔ D ≤ 2 (δ − α)
2
3β
(with equality when D =
2 (δ − α)2
3β
).
However, it is clear by a simple comparison that
2 (δ − α)2
3β
≥ 3δ
2
32β
≥ (4α− δ)δ
16β
⇔ α ≤ 5δ
8
(with equality when α =
5δ
8
).
Hence, when α ≤ 5δ8 , it follows that θ∗ > θs for 3(δ−α)
2
8β ≤ D < (4α−δ)δ16β . For (4α−δ)δ16β ≤ D < 3δ
2
32β , we
have θs < θ∗ = 1. And finally, for D > 3δ
2
32β , θ
s = θ∗ = 1.
When 5δ8 < α ≤ δ, on the other hand, the above calculations imply that θ∗ ≷ θs as D ≶ 2(α−δ)
2
3β .
Hence, disclosure is insufficient if α ≤ 5δ8 , or otherwise if α > 5δ8 and D < 2(δ−α)
2
3β .
Proof of Proposition 3. Here, I compare the values of θ∗ and θs in expressions (23) and (24).
Note that
3δ2
8β
≥ α
2 − (α− δ)2
4β
⇔ α ≤ 5δ
4
(with equality when α =
5δ
4
).
Rewrite
√
8βD
3δ2
as (α−δ)δ
√
8βD
3(α−δ)2 . When α ≤
5δ
4 , comparing θ
∗ and θs yields
θ∗ ≥ θs ⇔
√
1 +
4βD
(α− δ)2 − 1 ≥
√
8βD
3 (α− δ)2
⇔ 2 + 4βD
(α− δ)2 − 2
√
1 +
4βD
(α− δ)2 ≥
8βD
3 (α− δ)2
⇔
(
1 +
2βD
3 (α− δ)2
)2
≥ 1 + 4βD
(α− δ)2
⇔
(
2βD
3 (α− δ)2
)2
≥ 8βD
3 (α− δ)2
⇔ D ≥ 6 (α− δ)
2
β
(with equality when D =
6 (α− δ)2
β
).
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It is easy to see that
3δ2
8β
≥ α
2 − (α− δ)2
4β
≥ 6 (α− δ)
2
β
⇔ α ≤ 5δ
8
(with equality when α =
5δ
8
).
It then follows that when α ≤ 5δ4 , θ∗ ≷ θs as D ≷ 6(α−δ)
2
β . When α >
5δ
4 , on the other hand, the
above calculations imply that θ∗ < θs < 1 for D < 3δ
2
8β , θ
∗ < θs = 1 for 3δ
2
8β ≤ D < α
2−(α−δ)2
4β ,
and θ∗ = θs = 1 for D ≥ α2−(α−δ)24β . Consequently, disclosure is insufficient if α ≤ 5δ4 and
6(α−δ)2
β < D ≤ 3δ
2
8β .
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